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Going spare? Concert tickets, touting and cultural value 
This article explores recent events around the secondary market for concert 
tickets in the UK. It first outlines the nature of the primary and secondary 
markets for concert tickets and then the story of attempts in the UK to regulate 
them over a twenty-year period, providing the political and industrial context.  It 
moves on to examine key aspects of the political debates around tickets and the 
findings of enquiries into the subject – including the rhetoric around ‘real fans’ – 
and discusses the gradual dilution of legislative proposals (from an outright ban, 
to a cap, to mandating transparency) and legitimation of the secondary market. 
We then discuss the broader ramifications of the secondary ticket market for 
access to cultural events and suggest that those who wish to mobilise against the 
secondary market could gain much by looking beyond the market value of tickets 
towards ideas of cultural value which have hitherto played little part in the 
debate. 
 
Keywords: concert ticket; secondary market; regulation; touting; cultural value 
Introduction 
In March 2017 leading concert promoter Stuart Galbraith appeared before the UK 
Parliament’s Culture, Media and Sport Committee (CMSC) and told them that ‘we have 
lost control of our own industry’ (CMSC 2017, Q. 274). He was referring to the fact that 
as a concert promoter he could not retain control of who resold tickets to events that he 
had organised. Galbraith’s appearance before the Committee was merely the latest 
action in an array of activity spanning twenty years around what has become known as 
“the secondary market” or, frequently, by the less complimentary label of “touting”. 
These years witnessed the issue of the selling-on of tickets for sporting matches, 
concerts and other events attract widespread political and media interest. For example, 
in 2015 clauses were inserted into what became the Consumer Rights Act stipulating the 
information that sellers on the secondary market must supply. Likewise, in 2016 there 
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was a government-funded independent enquiry (Waterson 2016) and another enquiry 
from within Parliament (CMSC 2016), while in 2017 the focus on touting resulted in 
changes to the law via the Digital Economy Act. In this article we trace the 
development of this interest, outline its political and industrial context, highlight some 
characteristics of the debate and provide some thoughts on how those concerned about 
the secondary market might proceed.  
Part 1: Live music and secondary ticketing 
In 2008 the economic value of live music in the UK exceeded that of recorded music for 
the first time in living memory (Page 2009). Since then the gap between them has 
grown (UK Music 2016) and in 2016 the difference in gross value added was estimated 
to be £340M (UK Music 2017, 11). There are nuances to this relationship, not least in 
the changes wrought to the recorded music sector through often illegal peer-to-peer 
services that circumvented rights-holders, then i-tunes and, latterly, streaming services. 
The situation for recorded music is complex, with a lower bar to entry for production 
(Prior 2010, 402-403), a concomitant increase in workplace precarity (Watson 2016, 12) 
and surrounding concern about artists’ remuneration (Marshall 2015). However, the 
broader industrial context is that while music fans are spending less on recorded music, 
they are willing to spend more and more on live music. Ticket prices, anyway, far 
outstrip overall inflation (Towse 2013, 319; Frith 2015, 269; Curran 2016) and the 
rhetoric around the value of live music echoes across the music industries (see Cloonan 
2012). In short people are seemingly willing to pay considerable sums of money to see 
live music and in such a context a secondary market for concert tickets is likely to 
thrive. 
 To show the importance of the secondary market a short diversion is necessary 
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to explain how the live music market works. In simplified form, artists above a certain 
level of economic activity generally employ agents who help them determine which 
gigs they will play. Such agents get contacted by concert promoters who wish to engage 
their artists to perform shows. If a deal is agreed, the promoter will arrange the hire of 
the venues and work with the agent to construct a tour. Promoters often use third parties 
– such as venue box offices – or a primary ticket agent – like Ticketmaster (TM, the 
largest such business) – to sell and distribute tickets, commonly online. Using such 
outlets is often necessary for promoters, who may have several events taking place 
across, and beyond, their home country with various box office arrangements to manage 
and they generally lack the facilities to undertake their own large scale ticketing 
operations.  
 The subsequent selling of tickets can be categorised as falling into two stages, 
encompassing the primary and secondary markets. In brief, the primary market consists 
of tickets for events sold by either the event organisers themselves or their designated 
agents. The re-sale of tickets after their initial release, usually for profit, is the 
secondary market, or “touting” to give its more vernacular, often derogatory, label. In 
simple economic terms a secondary market arises because the primary one has not 
satiated demand, sometimes because the product has been under-priced in market terms. 
We return to such concerns below.  
Meanwhile touting has a long history, traditionally associated with shady figures 
operating outside venues. Leakage between the primary sellers and the touts has a 
similarly long lineage. Controversy surrounding ticketing practices goes back to at least 
the eighteenth century when impresarios complained of booksellers profiting from 
selling on single event tickets from seasonal subscriptions (McVeigh 2006, 19). In 
interview artist manager, and former chair of the Music Managers Forum, Peter Jenner 
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said, ‘they’ve always been doing that’ and spoke of top promoters, going back to the 
1960s passing tickets to family members to tout, or rows of seats being ‘taken off of the 
plan’ 1 (2008, emphasis Jenner), while veteran promoter Harold Davison (2010) 
reported problems with touts in the 1950s. But through the combination of electronic 
purchase of tickets online and particularly since the rise of e-bay and other reselling 
sites, alongside the movement of e-commerce into the home, the practice has become 
scaled-up, normalised and internationalised. It should be noted that while not immune 
from touting, ‘grassroots’ venues are less likely to be overly concerned with it since 
reselling mainly affects the limited availability of tickets for bigger acts in larger 
capacity venues. The reality behind the term ‘grassroots’ is also somewhat complex 
and, as with ‘major’ and ‘independent’ record labels, integration in the industry means 
that there are multiple nuances as major companies have a stake in ostensibly 
independent venues. It remains the case, however, that touting generally has a smaller 
effect at the ‘grassroots’. There is also, in fact, some scope for smaller venues and 
companies to benefit from internet technology since cheaper data processing and 
technical services afford the possibility of running their own ticketing, keeping 
transaction charges, and databases of fan information for use in local marketing 
(Johansson et al, 123-4).  
Across venues types, however, both primary and secondary ticketing now 
operate mainly via the internet. While the digital age of music has also witnessed an 
apparent “boom” in live music2, it should be acknowledged that the internet has had 
important implications for traditional business practices in the live music sector which 
have received much less attention than those surrounding recorded music. Differences 
between the two sectors make direct comparisons difficult, yet we would contend that 
the internet has also affected the live sector significantly. Promotional practices are now 
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increasingly centred around social media, for instance. Likewise, tactics such as Taylor 
Swift’s ‘Verified Fan’ initiative (Hann 2017), which rewards purchases of recordings or 
merchandise with a preferential place in the online queue for tickets, illustrate the 
increasing convergence of marketing and sales across sectors, partly driven by changes 
to the way that tickets are exchanged, especially at the upper end of the market. 
Moreover, as we shall see, the status of tickets brought in to question the very nature of 
a key component of neoclassical economy theory – property. 
 Our focus here is primarily the UK. However, this immediately requires 
addressing two important contextual issues. The first is that it is hard to unravel the UK 
live music sector from the international framework in which it sits, especially regarding 
commercially successful, large scale touring acts (precisely those whose tickets are in 
high demand and likely to end up on the secondary market). The key actor for an 
individual event is the aforementioned promoter – the person or company who 
organises the concert by booking the artist and the venue. A major tour may involve 
numerous promoters in numerous cities across various national boundaries. On the face 
of it, the bulk of the commercial risk rests with the promoter (Cloonan 2012) and it is 
the promoter who will ultimately, depending on fee negotiations with artists and venue, 
set a price.  
 Artists may deal with several promoters over the course of a tour (although some 
tours may involve exclusive arrangements). Meanwhile major promoters may be 
working with many artists in various countries at any one time. Ticketing agents are the 
primary point of contact for customers - and a means of rationalising the process for all 
concerned - for musical, theatrical and sporting events alike. However, the business of 
concert promotion in particular has seen greater integration since the 1990s, with a 
smaller number of multinational players owning stakes in both venues and promotional 
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companies internationally. For example, US-based Live Nation is arguably the world’s 
largest music company and has a significant stake in UK venues and promoters (Behr et 
al 2016, 10), alongside other companies like AEG, within a market which is 
increasingly oligopolistic, especially at the upper end. Additionally, Live Nation also 
acts in other areas of the music industries including artist management, agencies and 
record companies. We return to its importance later. 
 Further complications arise from the fact that this integrative trend is extended 
beyond promotions into the ticketing companies themselves, notably by the merger in 
2010 of Live Nation with Ticketmaster, which overcame some regulatory hurdles and 
associated controversy in both the U.K and U.S (Street 2012, 581–583), thus illustrating 
the fundamentally transnational aspects of the live music sector. This also leads onto the 
second key contextual factor, namely, the entanglement of the primary and secondary 
markets.  
 In his independent report on the secondary market, Mike Waterson noted that it 
is impossible to understand that market without understanding the primary market from 
which it emerges (Waterson 2016, 7). This is perhaps best exemplified via a brief 
discussion of Ticketmaster, the world’s largest such retailer.3 This primary agent was 
initially highly critical of the secondary market. A memorandum submitted to the UK 
Parliament’s Culture Media and Sport Committee (CMSC) in 2007 called touting 
‘wrong in principle’ and stated that ‘[t]he unauthorised resale of tickets for profit does 
not promote fair and equitable distribution of tickets, and drains tickets away from the 
primary market, thus restricting the opportunity for genuine fans to purchase them 
legitimately’ (CMSC 2008,  Ev. 29, emphasis ours). It also called for the CMSC to 
recommend ‘strongly that the Government act to make the unauthorised resale of all 
event tickets, at higher than face value, a criminal offence through primary legislation’ 
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(ibid., Ev. 32, emphasis ours). As will become, clear the word “unauthorised” took on 
greater importance as the story progressed.  
 Initially it appeared as if Ticketmaster was performing something of a volte-face 
in 2008 when it purchased the ticket reselling website GetMeIn, arguing that this would 
bring reliability and security to the resale market. Its then MD, Chris Edmonds, referred 
to a ‘responsibility upon us to offer a trusted resale and exchange service, which offers 
consumers choice, flexibility and, most importantly, increased protection’ (Edmonds 
2008). However, in the longer term it became apparent that Ticketmaster was never 
opposed to the secondary market per se, just its “unauthorised” sections.  
 Meanwhile Ticketmaster’s claim to be bringing legitimacy to the secondary 
market merely served to highlight how much such legitimacy was needed. One example 
of this came in 2012 when the Channel 4 documentary series Dispatches aired an 
episode – ‘The Great Ticket Scandal’ – alleging that two secondary sites which 
ostensibly existed for fans to exchange tickets – Viagogo and Seatwave – were actually 
engaged in industrial scale ticket purchases specifically for the purpose of reselling at 
large mark-ups. Furthermore, the programme claimed that some promoters were selling 
directly to these sites, cutting out the primary market and effectively forcing fans to pay 
sums vastly above face value for tickets. Aside from the moral implications of this, and 
the controversy surrounding the documentary (Channel 4 2013), this is significant since 
it illustrates both the internecine nature of ticketing as a whole and, accordingly, the 
difficultly in discussing the secondary market without assessing its relationship to the 
primary.  
 The secondary market in concert tickets can be seen as partly resulting from the 
peculiar nature of the live music sector. One issue here is how prices are set in the first 
place. This often seems to be a somewhat inexact science. For example, Geoff Ellis, 
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promoter of numerous stadium and arena gigs, said that when setting prices, he 
generally charged what he thought comparable gigs were costing (Ellis 2011). Veteran 
promoter John Giddings also suggested that the existence of the secondary market was 
evidence that ‘we haven’t charged enough for our tickets’ (Giddings 2010). The 
equation of how many fans will pay what amount of money for a given show is 
complicated, especially if the venue has several price points and if the artist’s team is 
successful in hyping up the event. Ticket sales, and the cachet of a ‘sold out’ event, feed 
into an artist’s status with a reputational advantage to being an “in demand” act, and 
financial gain from the perception that fans should act fast to access tickets in scarce 
supply. Additionally, some acts wish to price tickets below what the market might bear 
to be seen as being fair to fans. Bruce Springsteen is a high profile example of this 
(Street 2013, 295). Furthermore, some promoters claim to charge below the market rate 
for newer acts in order to develop a longer-term fan base. While it is, of course, possible 
to treat such claims with some scepticism, evidence of these practices has been found in 
official reports (CMSC 2008, 13, 38; Waterson, 77). 
 Meanwhile one new aspect of the online world was a vastly increased scale of 
secondary market activity. This was heightened still further by the development of 
software tools, known as bots, which potentially allow touts to harvest thousands of 
tickets as soon as they go on sale. Waterson also found two additional things that 
pertain here. The first is that official ticket release times to the general public are often 
inconvenient for large numbers of fans. The second is that various deals done with 
sponsors mean that at the time of tickets officially going on sale around 40% of tickets 
will already have been sold. Sometimes (in the USA) this figure can be as much as 85-
90% of the overall ticket inventory (Waterson 2016, 77). Consequently, Waterson  
(ibid.) called for greater transparency from primary agents. 
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Having explained the growing economic importance of the live market and some 
of the complexities of its mechanics, we now turn towards the policy context and an 
overview of attempts to regulate ticketing. 
Part 2: The policy context 
A handy starting-point for consideration of the secondary ticket market is the Labour 
Party’s 1997 policy document – Labour’s Sporting Nation. This proclaimed that ‘we 
will legislate against ticket touting’ (Labour Party 1997, 4). While the focus here was 
sport, ticket touting per se was in the Party’s sights. However, nothing came of this. 
Importantly, under current UK legislation the unauthorised resale of tickets for 
entertainment events is only illegal in the case of most professional football matches 
where the 1994 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act outlawed the practice following 
concerns about violent disorder if rival fans were allowed to mix freely. In addition the 
unauthorised resale of tickets for the London 2012 Olympics was illegal under the 2006 
London Olympics and Paralympic Games Act, the International Olympic Committee 
requiring such restrictions as a condition of the UK being granted the event. Other than 
this, reselling of tickets is perfectly legal provided that various consumer and trading 
laws are respected (Waterson 2016, 55). 
 The next political development came in 2005 when, following several 
complaints about secondary trading, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) published the 
results of its enquiry into the UK’s ticket agents. The background to this was a massive 
growth in the live sector in general – the report noted an increase in turnover of 150% 
for primary tickets agents between 1999 and 2003 (OFT 2005, 1). It also noted growing 
concern about the secondary market, which had accounted for half of all complaints 
about tickets submitted to the Trading Standards Department and 75% of those 
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submitted to the OFT (ibid., 3). Nevertheless the report concluded that: ‘Secondary 
agents can provide a useful function and benefit to consumers. Their existence arises in 
particular because, for some events or individual performances … the actual demand for 
tickets turns out to be greater than expected’ (ibid., 73). While it saw evidence of 
fraudulent activity, this was found to be in contravention of existing laws (ibid., 80). It 
thus did not recommend further legislation, but more stringent enforcement of those 
existing laws.  
 However, the scale of the secondary market and the size of the mark-ups therein 
continued to attract media attention. Meanwhile some concert promoters, deeply 
unhappy about the expansion of the secondary market, made accusations of unethical 
behaviour at fans’ expense by third parties who benefitted from promoters’ own risk 
while putting nothing back into the industry (CMSC 2008, Ev. 17). Such concerns 
attracted some political attention. The UK Government of the time was reorienting its 
priorities from ‘cultural’ to ‘creative industries’ policy (Behr 2015) and sought closer 
relationships with the music industries (Cloonan 2007). Feeling compelled to respond, it 
met representatives from events organisers and ticket sellers in December 2005. Three 
further meetings – dubbed “touts summits” by the press – followed (CMSC 2008, Ev. 
71). In July 2006 the Minister for Culture, Media and Sport, Tessa Jowell, said that she 
was giving the ticket industry a year to sort itself out or face legislation (DCMS 2006). 
After the last “summit” the following February she said that: ‘Exploitation and 
excessive profiteering by touts puts tickets out of the reach of real fans – it is a corrosive 
force in entertainment. We are determined to protect consumers against this’ (DCMS 
2007). 
 Political interest was also evident in Parliament, where the cross-party Culture, 
Media and Sport Committee launched an inquiry into what it explicitly labelled as 
 12 
‘touting’. This took evidence from across the sector and witnessed vehement 
denunciations of touts from members of the Concert Promoters Association (CPA) and 
equally strenuous support of the secondary market from re-sellers such as Viagogo and 
e-Bay. Ultimately the Committee was not convinced that new legislation was necessary. 
Here it was partly hindered by the legal ambiguity of the terms and conditions attached 
to tickets in the primary market. Such conditions are routinely included by promoters, 
but appear to have little concrete legal grounding in a situation described by Waterson 
(2016, 102) as one where ‘there is too much conjecture and not enough guidance’. The 
fact that terms of sale – and, indeed, the very status of a ticket itself – have yet to be 
subject to case law (ibid., 50) allowed re-sellers to argue that tickets are transferrable 
property.  
 Concert promoters disagreed, arguing that tickets remained their property even 
once sold and that all that the purchaser had bought was a set of entitlements that 
included entry to the event, subject to certain conditions. One right which was often 
specifically excluded was that of selling the ticket on to a third party. This was held by 
promoters to invalidate the ticket. Seeing themselves as the owners of the tickets, 
promoters argued that they could set limits to what could and could not be done with 
them. The CPA contended that the ticket was simply ‘a licence to enter [a] performance 
on private property’ (CMSC 2008: Ev 18). Thus, for the CPA, when a ticket was in the 
purchaser’s hand, this signified that the holder had a certain level of rights, not that it 
was the buyer’s property. If such notions seem far-fetched it should also be noted that 
they have some longevity. For example, in 2017 Ticketmaster’s website still proclaimed 
that: ‘Any ticket you purchase from us remains the property of the Event Partner and is 
a personal revocable licence which may be withdrawn and admission refused at any 
time’ (Ticketmaster nd.) and many sporting bodies still maintain that a ticket is indeed a 
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revocable licence (Waterson 2016, 98-99). Ticketmaster’s proclamations above should 
be seen in the light of the fact that it owns the GetMeIn and Seatwave reselling sites. 
But what was at stake here was the status of a ticket as property and this helps to 
illustrate the questions this issue raises in terms of economic theory.  
 In 2008 the Committee ultimately baulked at legislating against the secondary 
market arguing that: 
Any attempt to ban the secondary market outright would also be a very serious 
step in that it would criminalise what has been a perfectly lawful activity, which 
is evidently valued and freely made use of by many consumers, in order to 
support the industries’ endeavours to target particular audiences. We do not 
consider that it would be either practicable or right to do so (CMSC 2008, 4). 
It recommended investigating the potential for ‘voluntary agreements’ (ibid., 35) with 
‘regulatory intervention [to] be considered only as a very last resort’ (ibid., 40). The 
then (Labour) government’s response was a press notice calling for a voluntary 
agreement from secondary agents that tickets for major sporting events - dubbed “the 
Crown Jewels” (ibid, Ev. 27) - would not be put on sale and a new code of practice to 
be developed by the Society of Ticket Agents and Retailers (Ward 2010, 13).   
 In February 2009 the Government announced a consultation on the secondary 
market in tickets for concerts and sporting events. This Department of Culture, Media 
and Sport enquiry (DCMS 2009) was followed by a Government response proposing 
further consultation, codes of best practice and better information and service, stating 
that ‘the industry itself is best placed … to provide day-to-day consumer information’ 
(DCMS 2010,17). The Government also maintained its longstanding position of 
supporting self-regulation, stating that: ‘the best way forward is to encourage a strong, 
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self-regulated primary market, but one which recognises the need for a healthy and safe 
secondary market’ (ibid., 4). 
 Meanwhile that market had been developing briskly as – having failed to get the 
legislation they wanted – promoters and primary sellers moved to protect their 
commercial interests. This was most dramatically evidenced by Ticketmaster’s 
aforementioned purchase of GetMeIn in 2008 and subsequent merger with Live Nation 
in a deal which was eventually approved by the UK’s Competition Commission in 
December 2009. Meanwhile support for new legislation came from music industries’ 
personnel under the heading ‘Ticket Touting Campaign’ (CMSC 2008, Ev. 123-125). 
which noted risks to ‘young, enthusiastic sport and music lovers’ (ibid, Ev. 123) and 
called for ‘legislation to outlaw ticket touting’ (ibid.). It also came from the author of 
Labour’s Sporting Nation, Lord Tom Pendry, who wrote that: ‘The support for 
outlawing all ticket touting is there, the legislation is there, now is the time to strengthen 
the current powers and stamp out this illegal trade once and for all’ (ibid., Ev. 120). The 
All Party Parliamentary Group on Music also endorsed the introduction of new 
legislation (ibid., Ev. 110-114). 
 However the general picture was one of less distinction between the primary and 
secondary markets and of diminishing legislative hurdles for reselling music tickets. By 
2010, with an outright ban on the secondary market off the political menu, Labour MP 
Sharon Hodgson launched a Private Member’s Bill, the Sale of Tickets (Sporting and 
Cultural Events) Bill. This aimed to cap the mark-up on resales at 10%. Hodgson said 
that she wanted to ‘take the money out of it’ (Live Music Exchange Newcastle 2016, 
32mins 44sec) as a disincentive to touts. The Bill was filibustered by Conservative 
backbenchers in January in 2011 and fell there. But it is worth noting that it did not 
explicitly oppose the secondary market in principle, concentrating instead on excessive 
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profiteering. This was symptomatic of a wider trend whereby the problems of the 
secondary market were cast as being more about regulation than whether such markets 
had a legitimate role to play in the provision of cultural goods. The question 
increasingly came to focus on regulation and authorised resale. 
 Political circles were also keenly aware that technology was changing the face 
of ticketing. One key development here was the aforementioned bots/botnets which 
allow touts to buy hundreds of tickets the instant they go on sale online and then to 
immediately place them onto the secondary market – often at several times the face 
value of the ticket - while simultaneously subverting limits which events organisers put 
on the amount of tickets an individual is allowed to buy. These featured alongside the 
use of stacks of credit cards in the Dispatches documentary, illustrating the tactics used 
to scoop up face value tickets for re-sale at swingeing prices. All this elicited further 
political concern that the scale of the secondary market was locking fans out of access 
to events.  
 Such concern coincided with high profile debates around tickets for the 2012 
London Olympics. The Metropolitan Police’s Operation Podium, which monitored 
tickets during the event, released a report on ticket crime in February 2013. This, again, 
flagged up the scale of the secondary market (£1billion) arguing that: ‘The lack of 
legislation outlawing the unauthorised resale of tickets and the absence of regulation of 
the primary and secondary ticket market encourages unscrupulous practices’ 
(Metropolitan Police 2013, 3, emphasis ours). Once more, the concentration was on 
unauthorised resale, rather than reselling itself. However, the fact that the International 
Olympic Committee’s demand for banning the resale of tickets was met, alongside a 
ban on reselling football tickets, illustrated that it is possible to legislate in the area – 
that is to limit or even prohibit a secondary market,4 albeit that this might have a range 
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of practical implications.  
 In 2013 an All Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on Ticket Abuse was formed 
under the co-chairs Hodgson and Tory MP Mike Weatherley, the latter subsequently 
being replaced by Tory peer Lord Colin Moynihan. The Group aimed to pursue ‘on a 
cross-party basis… action to reform the secondary ticketing market in the interests of 
consumers and rights holders, particularly by increasing the transparency of ticket 
supply’ (APPG 2014, 2). Having conducted its own short investigation of the market, 
the Group decided to piggy-back its call for transparency onto the Consumer Rights Bill 
which was then moving through Parliament. It called for amendments to the Bill to 
‘ensure that all relevant information about a ticket sold on a secondary platform, 
including on the individual selling them, is available to consumers [and] that secondary 
platforms should make clear at every stage of the purchasing process where tickets are 
being resold in contravention of the terms and conditions stated on them’ (ibid., 5).  
 It warrants mention that, again, this is a tacit approval of the secondary market 
since it implies that as long as it is transparent, it is legitimate. This is somewhat 
removed from Pendry’s 1997 quest (repeated ten years later) to legislate against touts. 
While the initial tranche of provisions in the clause inserted into the Bill by the House 
of Lords in 2014 was rejected by the government in January 2015, backing for changes 
to the secondary market had started to reach a tipping point with support coming from 
ever higher-profile music industry personnel. Prominent acts such as Iron Maiden threw 
their weight behind the Put Fans First campaign (Malt 2015). They were amongst a host 
of signatories from the music and sport worlds to an open letter calling for greater 
transparency (Merrick 2015). Once again the secondary market itself was no longer the 
target, but its machinations and excesses.  
 17 
 Following further political wrangling, a clause inserted by Moynihan in the 
House of Lords was accepted by the Government and formed part of the 2015 
Consumer Rights Act (CRA). This required sellers in the online secondary market to 
provide details about the tickets including: the location of seats, any restrictions which 
might apply to their usage, face value and any links which the seller had with the event 
organiser (UK Parliament 2015,Chapter 5). 
 The Act also mandated the DCMS and Department of Business, Innovation and 
Skills (BIS)5 to commission an independent review of ‘Consumer Protection Measures 
related to Online Secondary Ticketing Platforms’. Chaired by economist Professor Mike 
Waterson, the review published its report in May 2016. Waterson also did not see the 
need for further regulation although he called for a review of compliance with the CRA 
(carried out by the Competition and Markets Authority from December 2016 – 
www.gov.uk/cma-cases/secondary-ticketing-websites), actions to ensure enforcement, 
the possibility of licensing secondary sellers and reform of information provided by 
primary sellers. He believed that a new law on bots was unnecessary, suggesting that 
their use might contravene existing legislation and calling for clarification of this 
question (Waterson 2016, 45-47). As noted above, another key finding was that many 
tickets had already been sold by the time official general sales began. This was perhaps 
the most problematic aspect of the primary market and clearly troubled Waterson. 
However, rather than proposing further legislation, he recommended tighter 
enforcement of existing laws and greater transparency in both markets. The 
Government accepted his recommendations in March 2017 (HM Government 2017a) 
and we examine some of the issues raised in, and by, the review in part three below.  
 The CMSC returned to the issue in November 2016 and held two public 
hearings on ticket abuse before its work was derailed by the announcement of the 2017 
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general election. At the first hearing, in November, MPs questioned Ticketmaster about 
its ownership of GetMeIn which, as noted above, resells tickets in contravention of 
TM’s own terms and conditions. The second, in March, was notable not only for 
Galbraith’s evidence, but also that of Ed Sheeran’s manager, Stuart Camp and 
especially for the fact that leading touting firm Viagogo refused to appear.6 In the 
March 2017 budget it was announced that the Government was taking action against 
‘unexpected fees’ (HM Government 2017b), suggesting that local Trading Standards 
Authorities would get more money to help them enforce the Consumer Rights Act.7 
 A final political twist to the story prior to the June 2017 general election came in 
April with the passing of the Digital Economy Act. This included provisions - again 
arising from the House of Lords - that required further information to be given about 
tickets and empowered the Minister to outlaw the use of bots (UK Parliament 2017, Part 
6, Section 106). While this was certainly a move against touts, the general picture is one 
whereby at each attempt to deal with the secondary market for tickets, the proposed 
legislative bar has been lowered – from an outright ban (Pendry), to a financial cap 
(Hodgson) to transparency (the CRA). Certainly, there was no outright restriction on re-
selling tickets at hugely inflated prices, simply the provision of more information for 
purchasers. Overall, the political journey over twenty years was away from banning 
touts towards regulating them. However, there are certain other dimensions to these 
events that warrant closer examination.  
Part 3: Characteristics of the debate. 
In this section we highlight some features of the debate around touting. These are 
technology, the rhetoric of “real” fans, the issue of “unauthorised” reselling, what fans 
actually think and the growing respectability of touting. 
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 In terms of technology, like much commerce, the internet has transformed 
touting. Initially, promoters railed against so-called “bedroom touts”, individuals who 
would buy more tickets than they wanted for a gig to sell them on – often in 
contravention of promoters’ terms and conditions as printed on the tickets. The latest 
technological fear was bots. In March 2017 the UK Government announced that it 
planned to introduce legislation which could outlaw their use, justifying this action on 
the basis that it was trying to protect “real fans” from being ripped off by unscrupulous 
businessmen. Thus Minister for Digital and Culture, Matt Hancock, said: 
It’s unacceptable that touts are misusing technology to bypass security measures 
and buy up vast numbers of tickets before real fans get the chance, only to sell 
them on at rip-off prices (BBC 2017)  
The fact that this law was passed shows that not all of Waterson’s views were accepted 
by the Government. His report, though noting the problem of bots, was equivocal about 
new legislation, observing that some uses of bots to obtain unauthorised access to 
ticketing platforms might already be proscribed by the Computer Misuse Act 1990 and 
calling on primary sellers to be vigilant and co-operate with police (Waterson, 19). He 
also acknowledged that ‘use of bots and botnets is not necessarily malevolent’ (ibid, 
23), and called for clarification of their uses under existing law (ibid, 69). Waterson’s 
qualms at sweeping new legislation over bots speaks to their widespread use across the 
financial sector, the legal profession and in heavy industry (Hill 2017). An outright ban 
could have broad implications. Nevertheless, in early 2018 a ban, at least in regard to 
ticketing, was introduced (Hanley 2018) and while on the surface their criminalisation 
might be a strange move for a free market inclined government to take it is pertinent to 
ask why such a government should be opposed to someone seeking to gain a market 
advantage by using technology. It is here that the rhetoric of “real fans” comes in to 
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play. 
 Time and again throughout the debate on the secondary market, the idea of the 
“real fan” has been mobilised. Labour Minister of Culture Tessa Jowell spoke of 
‘exploitation and excessive profiteering by touts [putting] tickets out of the reach of real 
fans’ (DCMS 2007) and Conservative MP Nigel Adams, who has also campaigned on 
the issue, referred to ensuring ‘that genuine fans are not fleeced by ticket touts and 
rogues’ (Davies 2017b). Similarly, the CPA argued that touting ‘prices real music fans 
out of being able to attend their favourite performances’ (CMSC 2008: Ev. 16) and 
Ticketmaster stated that ‘[w]e work tirelessly in partnership with artists to get tickets in 
to the hands of real, verified fans’ (Koebler 2017). In addition Viagogo proclaimed on 
its website that it was providing ‘real tickets for real fans’ (Viagogo/Web Archive 
2008). 
 The idea of “real fans” has widespread support in political and business circles. 
Politically it has obvious cachet as it speaks of the average person being ripped off by 
faceless scammers who exploit fans’ love of music or sport. But the notion of the “real 
fan” is problematic. In part this is because the concept of “fandom” itself is contested 
territory. While many accounts celebrate the creativity of fans (e.g Duffett 2013a, 
2013b), others associate fandom with the potential for exploitation, manipulation and 
commodification (Thrift 2006; Stanfill and Condis 2014). It may also raise challenges 
for notions of the rational consumer as it is at least possible that fandom is a largely 
irrational activity. If neoliberal economics is underpinned by ideas of rational choice, 
then what about choices which are, in economic terms, irrational? It is also important to 
note that the notion of a real fan suggests that this relationship is something which goes 
beyond the purely economic. 
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 The question also arises of who such people are. Having highlighted the number 
of tickets already sold (Waterson 2016, 17) by the time of official sales starting, 
Waterson called for greater transparency from primary agents about what percentage of 
tickets actually go on “general sale” (ibid., 77 and 94). Here it would be reasonable to 
question whether such large amounts of presales benefit “real fans”, or whether they 
serve the interests of a mixture of corporate sponsors (who generally lack an 
appreciation of the artists), others with the right credit card and those richer fans who 
can afford to buy the various expensive packages which promoters and acts now 
routinely offer. As Waterson suggested, here it could be that it is the primary market 
which hits “real fans” so that if any government really wants to protect real fans then it 
has to intervene in the primary as well as the secondary market. If “real fans” are not 
simply those willing to pay most, then limiting presales could be in their interest. This 
moves beyond regulation to intervention. 
 It is important to recognise that the political and business rhetoric around the 
secondary market for tickets has moved from banning resale to banning unauthorised 
resale. Vertical integrations within the live music industry are potentially important 
here. If, as in the case of Live Nation Entertainment, parts of the same company that is 
promoting the show are also selling tickets on the primary market and own a reselling 
site, then such authorisation might be relatively easy to arrange. Here there is a clear 
pathway from promoter to primary seller and on to the secondary market – with the 
same company gaining financially at each stage. It is unsurprising, then, that the CMSC 
questioned TM’s relationship with GetMeIn. The fact that leading sporting 
organisations now often have official resellers8 muddies the water still further. So now 
it is not touting per se which is frowned upon, but touting without the authorisation of 
events organisers. Indeed it appears that for some analysts it is being unauthorised 
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which defines someone as being a tout rather than a “secondary agent”, with the 
Guardian asking ‘Do secondary sites try to stop touts’ (Davies 2017a) and clearly 
distinguishing between secondary sites and touts (Davies 2017b).  
 As for the “real fans”, it is clear that ‘tout’ is a derogatory term and the use of 
‘secondary ticketing’ instead can be seen as an attempt to bring respectability to what 
has often been seen as a questionable practice. Previous research has suggested that 
people are ambivalent towards touting, often admitting to doing it themselves, while 
disapproving of it being done on a mass scale  (Keegan and Campbell 2007). Similarly 
the CMSC found that people’s views on this were ‘ambivalent and contradictory’ (2008, 
9). This allows for proponents of the free market to argue that they have fans’ best 
interests at heart. Within political circles Sajid Javid, Culture Secretary at the time of 
Hodgson’s abortive Sale of Tickets Bill, used the attendant debate to describe secondary 
sellers as “classic entrepreneurs” (Hansard House of Commons, 21 January 2011: 
Column 1184), castigating their opponents as ‘chattering middle classes and champagne 
socialists, who have no interest in helping the common working man earn a decent 
living by acting as a middleman in the sale of a proper service’ (ibid., Column 1187).  
 Waterson also found mixed attitudes with around half of respondents to his call 
for evidence mentioning profiteering and unfairness in relation to the secondary market, 
although 25% also reported purchasing from it (Waterson 2016, 154). However it was 
also clear that many “real fans” often do not know the difference between primary and 
secondary agents.9 This also works against ideas of fans as participating in rational 
choice. It certainly brings into question the degree to which those choices are informed 
if even the market-oriented aspects of their decisions are coloured by a lack of clarity 
about the distinction between primary and secondary sellers. Complicating matters 
further is that the latter will pay for such things as google ads, so that it is the secondary 
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sites which are more likely to come up if a “real fan” uses a search engine and enters an 
artist’s name and “tickets”.10 Overall it is perhaps fair to say that many people feel at 
best ambivalent about the secondary ticket market, with some avowedly against it. 
 It is also apparent that in recent years touting has moved from the margins to the 
mainstream and become increasingly respectable. Waterson (2016, 119) accepted a 
rough valuation of £1B for the secondary sector in the UK, well in excess of the £662M 
value given by the music industries’ lobbying group, UK Music, for the live sector 
overall three years later, in a period of growth (www.ukmusic.org/news/true-value-of-
music-industry-to-uk-economy-revealed). So the secondary ticket market is now a 
major part of the contemporary music industries. It is a highly sophisticated global 
industry made up of powerful players. Indeed it is now at the heart of key music  
companies. Thus Live Nation’s quarterly and annual reports for investors contain 
numerous references to growing the secondary market. Its Annual Report of 2015, for 
example, noted 34% growth in secondary ticketing, describing it as a ‘major focus’ and 
signalling ‘Grow[ing] Secondary Ticket Volume’ as a part of company strategy (Live 
Nation 2016, Introduction and p. 3). 
 Such reports show Ticketmaster to be a highly profitable part of Live Nation and 
a large part of this success derives from GetMeIn, which has been cited as having the 
most impressive growth figures within Live Nation (Cooke 2017a). In other words, the 
‘secondary’ market is something of a misnomer as it may well be the most profitable 
part of the modern music industries. It lies at the very heart of Live Nation which 
proclaims itself to be: ‘by far the largest financial supporter of artists in music’ (Live 
Nation 2017) and ‘the largest producer of live concerts in the world’ (Live Nation 2016, 
2). Meanwhile its subsidiary GetMeIn has been found to provide specialist software, 
capable of being used by touts, to allow people to sell tickets through their website 
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(Izundu 2017) and of routinely flouting UK law (Galbraith, CMSC 2017, Q. 286).  
 Overall, reselling is no longer on the fringes but a key part of the biggest music 
company in the world. While this may be the legitimate, fan friendly, GetMeIn style 
internet trade, rather than dodgy characters lurking outside venues, it is still reselling at 
more than face value – and that effectively constitutes touting. 
Part Four: Concluding thoughts. 
We conclude here by pointing out another key aspect of the legislative process around 
ticketing. This is that throughout - and notwithstanding the motivations behind attempts 
to ensure a fairer deal for fans - the focus was on the ticket as an object of financial 
transaction, specifically on whether it constituted a piece of property and, if so, who the 
owner was. The cultural value of the activities to which tickets allow entry was 
secondary, with fans framed first and foremost as consumers. John Street (2013, 295) 
uses Bruce Springsteen’s policy of pricing his tickets below market value as one of 
several examples to make a broader point about cultural policy. 
[T]here is a tension between the logic of the market for economic efficiency and 
some countervailing political argument. This is where policy operates. The point 
is that the challenge posed by politics derives from the political value constituted 
in music. Commonly, this value is expressed in terms of rights – which are 
cashed out in diversity, or freedom of expression, or of ownership.  
Such considerations pertain to the concept of a live music “ecology” (Behr et al 2016) 
wherein audiences, promoters, musicians from grassroots to stadium fillers, and venues 
of all sizes exist alongside one another and are affected by both local and national 
policymaking, as well as their own interactions. If such a model is valid then a purely 
 25 
market approach to ticketing is flawed. Here, considering the rights to which Street 
refers may serve the long-term sustainability of a thriving ecology and we move now to 
this as it concerns the cultural and ethical dimensions of ticketing. 
 One concerning aspect here is the legitimation of reselling, especially for large 
profits. There is certainly a case for arguing that (live) music is just another commodity 
to be bought and sold. Those who argue that it is are precisely the touts whose case is 
that they are simply meeting market demand. Indeed one tactic for touts such as 
StubHub is to say that they are standing up for “real fans”’ rights to resell.11 It is also 
noticeable that, as already illustrated, the idea of real fans has been mobilised by 
secondary agents, with an email from Ticketmaster to customers in February 2017 
claiming that it sells ‘real merchandise for real fans’.12 However, even in commodity 
terms, live music is a particular sort of commodity, which Waterson (2016, 146) related 
to its “never to be repeated” aspect.  In fact concert promoters themselves know that 
what they are selling is a special sort of commodity – live music is an experiential 
economy, sold on its uniqueness (Cloonan 2012) and live performance a time bound 
and therefore ‘specialized practice within distinct domains of cultural production’ (Holt 
2010, 245). There is only one night that a gig will take place. At the very least it can be 
argued that a gig is very different sort of commodity to, say, a can of beans. Despite 
what StubHub might want to claim, live music is not simply just another commodity.13 
 Moreover music is not just about the market, and its status as a cultural good 
means that its health merits market intervention in ways which are only partly justifiable 
simply via talk of real fans, a term which Waterson (2016,135) reported as not being 
helpful to his inquiry. In fact music is rarely thought of in purely financial terms. We 
tend to conceive of it as something that makes us human and we suggest here that 
humanity is more than a set of financial transactions. Every major event in human life 
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(and death) is marked by the presence of music. Thus while making and listening to 
music certainly have their economic aspects, they are not primarily economic activities. 
As Frith (2013) has noted ‘Music is not made by the rational economic individual 
fantasised by market theorists’. Such activities have social and cultural value that lies 
beyond their financial impact, regardless of how important that might be. Music has 
been held to have intrinsic value as well as  – pardon the pun – instrumental (Behr, 
Brennan and Cloonan 2016).  
 If (live) music is part of our very humanity then government intervention in its 
fate is easily justified. Should musicians, industry personnel, legislators and fans want 
to limit the activities of touts, then they need to mobilise arguments which stress the 
cultural value of the events around which they wish to restrict certain financial 
transactions. Understanding that audiences themselves see live music as something 
more than a financial transaction provides potential for a response to the secondary 
market which also moves beyond the economic and considers tickets as something other 
than a form of property whose ownership is disputed. Indeed, the potential for even 
liberal governments to intercede along these lines is evidenced by recent moves in New 
South Wales to introduce fines for reselling or advertising the resale of tickets for 
sporting and entertainment events at over 10% of the original price – the same amount 
proposed by Hodgson in 2011  (Cooke 2017b). 
 Furthermore, if a reasonable policy aspiration is to achieve the widest possible 
range of people being able to see the widest possible range of artists, then simply the 
ability to pay high prices on either the primary or the secondary market is unlikely to 
bring about this result. Indeed Waterson (2016, 32 and 77) noted a number of reasons as 
to why tickets are not simply priced on the primary market at whatever the market will 
bear. This is partly because of a recognition that live music has great cultural value and 
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a long history of the market not necessarily being the greater guarantor of such value. 
While conceding that cultural value remains a problematic concept, at a minimum it 
moves the agenda on from simply financial concerns and this aligns it with the idea that 
music has intrinsic value (Behr, Brennan and Cloonan 2016, 416). Waterson’s 
suggestion that the government intervene in the primary market has a range of cultural 
policy implications which bear further thought.  
 Our previous research has suggested that while people struggle to articulate what 
they value in live music, such attempts are often couched in a sense of escapism and 
transcendent experience (ibid.). Respondents saw a range of values in live music, of 
which the financial was seldom the most important (ibid., 411). For fans  – “real” or not 
– music is not primarily an economic activity, for the tout it has to be. Fans can be 
concerned with cultural value as an end in itself, for touts it is at best a means to an end. 
While the debate has thus far focused on individual property rights, we suggest that it 
needs to move towards an acknowledgement of collective cultural rights. For example, 
it is possible to argue that the Glastonbury festival is now part of the UK’s common 
culture, regardless of who owns it. If it is possible to conceive of a “crown jewels” of 
sporting events on the basis of their importance to national culture then it is a small step 
to see at least some live music events achieving the same status. There is no reason why 
a prominent tour or a leading festival (like Glastonbury or the Proms) should be any less 
of a “crown jewels” event than the F.A.Cup Final.  
 We suggest that unless we seek to justify intervention in the ticketing markets – 
both primary and secondary – in the name of culture, we will continue to be swamped 
by the secondary market’s own culture. There is therefore a need to understand more 
about what people see as the intrinsic value of live music and perhaps better grounds to 
trust musicians with the future of live music than to trust StubHub. There is also good 
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reason to question why Viagogo was accused of “moral repugnance” for reselling 
tickets for an Ed Sheeran benefit gig to raise money for teenage cancer victims (BBC 
2017). Some commodities have value beyond the financial and so should not simply be 
bought and sold. In short rather than asking “who wants tickets”, we should ask who 
wants access to the culture that live music provides. If the answer to that is “everyone”, 
then this has policy implications beyond simply regulating, and ensuring the 
transparency of, the secondary market through to intervening in both the primary and 
secondary. “Real fans” deserve no less.  
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